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An Interdisciplinary Quick Assessment Strategy
to Support Decision-Making in Disaster Operationsl
The Costa Rica Barthquake, April 22, 1991
Louise K. Comfort
University of Pittsburgh
Bfficiency in Disaster Response Operations
This report presents findings from a quick response study to
Costa Rica following the April 22, 1991 earthquake in the Valle
de Estrella, on the Caribbean slope of the Cordillera de Talaman-
ca, close to the southeastern border with Panama. The earthquake
registered 7.4 on the Richter scale of surface wave magnitude,'
the most powerful earthquake recorded in this century of Costa
Rica's significant seismic history. The overall cost of damage
caused to infrastructure, losses in export, commercial wood,
commercial soils, housing and social infrastructure were esti-
mated at US $965 million, close to US$ 1 billion (Bermudez,
1993:3-5). This sum represents approximately 7% of Costa Rica's
Gross National Product, a substantial loss for a nation of 2.6
million people.
The research design proposed for this quick response study
addressed the problem of efficiency in disaster response oper-
ations. Repeated studies of decision-making in disaster opera-
tions have identified the problem of accurate, timely, informa-
tion to support decision-making as one of the primary needs of
'Local magnitude, MI, was reported as 7.2. These
calculations were reported by the Seismological Department,
University of Costa Rica. EQE International, Inc. 1991. The April
22, 1991 Valled de la Estrella Costa Rica Earthgyake: A Quick
Look Report. (May): p.3.
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disaster managers. The problem is compounded in complex environ-
ments where decision processes in disaster operations necessarily
cross disciplinary, organizational and jurisdictional boundaries.
The problem is further compounded by the necessity to update and
aggregate incoming information regarding the impact of the
disaster event upon the affected community, its population and
infrastructure with existing knowledge of the community, in order
to provide timely, valid information to support policy making in
disaster operations.
The research design proposed for this study sought to devel-
op an interdisciplinary quick assessment strategy that would
assess the capacity of a stricken community to respond to a di-
saster event in five critical disciplines: public policy and
management, medicine, public health, engineering, and information
processes. While other disciplines are relevant, these five
disciplines were selected as essential to any disaster response.
Timely assessment of conditions in the disaster environment from
these five disciplinary perspectives is essential to mobilizing
efficient response to disaster. Three components were envisioned
for the quick assessment strategy: 1) identification of the
information requirements for assessing the capacity of the
affected community to respond to disaster both within and across
the five disciplines; 2) design of an interdisciplinary, interor-
ganizational format to process the incoming information from a
specific disaster and transmit it to appropriate disaster manage-
ment personnel in their respective organizations and jurisdic-
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tions; and 3) design of a set of procedures for validation of
incoming information, as well as continuous review and integra-
tion of this information with existing knowledge about the
affected community.
This research design, developed to apply to a generic
problem in disaster response, underwent some modifications in its
implementation to fit the actual context of disaster operations
following the April 22, 1991 earthquake in Costa Rica. This
report presents the findings from a 14-day quick.response.tripto--
Costa Rica, April 24, 1991 - May 8, 1991. The report is organized
in three parts: 1) the context of the disaster and identification
of the major functions and organizations involved in disaster
response; 2) the information processes used in disaster opera-
tions as they were observed through organizational interactions
and on-site interviews; and 3) the validation of professional
observation of these information processes through content
analysis of professional reports and newspaper accounts of
disaster response operations.
The Context of Costa Rican Disaster Operations, April 22, 1991
By observable criteria, in April, 1991, Costa Rica had one
of the most advanced emergency planning organizations with high
potential for emergency response in Latin America. The Comision
Nacional Emergencia (CNE) was operating from modern, well-design-
ed offices in San Jose, with a professional sta~f that included
experts in geology, engineering, medicine, and computer science
affiliated with the University of Costa Rica, major national
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industries, such as the Refineria Costarricense de Petroleo
(RECOPE), and major hospitals in San Jose. The National Emergency
Plan assigned the primary responsibility for managing and coordi-
nating all activities relating to disaster to the CNE, which
reported directly to the President of the Republic. 2 The CNE had
recently invested in a $2 million computerized emergency informa-
tion system, and was engaged in developing a hazards vulnerabil-
ity analysis for the entire country.3
The CNE had established good working relationships with interna-
tional agencies located in San Jose that were also working to
improve disaster preparedness and response: the US Regional
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Regional Office of the
Pan American Health Organization, and the Regional Office of the
League of Red Cross Societies. It had organized planning exer-
cises for its staff and affiliated institutions at the national
level. In short, the CNE had a well-trained staff who were
working hard to carry out the mission of their agency as they
understood it. The staff had developed an ambitious agenda for a
small nation that was vulnerable to a range of serious hazards.
2National Emergency Plan. National Emergency Committee. San
Jose, Costa Rica, 1991:4.1. Portions of the plan were translated
and made available by Dr. Teofilo Sarkis as part of his report to
the United Nations Interregional Seminar, Jakarta, Indonesia,
December 13-18, 1993. Dr. Sarkis played an active role in Red
Cross medical response in Limon during the disaster operations,
April 22-28, 1991.
3This system, the Emergency Information System, was
purchased with funds from the International Development Agency of
Canada. Interview, Luis Diego Morales, Director of Planning, CNE,
April 26, 1991.
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It had prudently allocated scarce resources and early efforts in
preparedness and training to the area of highest perceived risk
and heaviest concentration of population, the Meseta Central
which included the capitol city of San Jose.
When the earthquake occurred on April 22, 1991, the CNE
assumed its legal obligations to coordinate response to the
disaster. Nonetheless, by April 25, 1991, the third day after the
severe earthquake, it was clear that there had been inadequate
information gathered to support effective -response to the city of
Limon, the isolated towns of Limon province, and the canton of
Turrialba, areas that suffered the heaviest damage. 4 President
Rafael Calderon announced that he was assuming direct control of
disaster operations and placed two of his Cabinet ministers, the
Minister of Agricultura y Ganaderia and the Minister of Vivienda
y Asentatmientos Humanos, in charge of disaster operations in the
province of Limon. The CNE would playa support role to the
government ministries in the conduct of disaster response and
recovery operations. s
This set of events, which effectively reversed the role of
the CNE according to the National Emergency Plan and the expecta-
tions of its president and executive director, illustrated
vividly the dynamics inherent in the research question I had come
to study: the design of an interdisciplinary quick assessment
4La Nacion, April 25, 1991: pp. 4A, 6A, SA, 11A
sPress conference conducted by Humberto Trejos, M.D.,
President, CNE, April 25, 1991, 6:00 p.m., San Jose, Costa Rica.
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strategy to support effective action in disaster response.
Occurring in the first days of my observation of disaster opera-
tions in Costa Rica, these events influenced the subsequent
course of my study. Clearly, existing information processes had
failed to provide the CNE with timely, accurate information to
support response action, but why and how had this occurred, and
what conditions were specific to this earthquake in contrast to
the procedures outlined in the formal National Emergency Plan? My
own observations of the CNE in operation and interviews with the
executive director, director of planning, director of operations,
and staff on site led me to reject the negative judgment of the
CNE offered by the media and others6 and to search for other
conditions which may have contributed to this marked shift in an
evolving emergency response system.
In this specific set of disaster operations, the processes
for gathering and analyzing information to support decision
making at the national level in response to local needs were not
fully in place at the CNE. Its major investment in a computer-
ized information system was relatively new, and most of the data
for the area affected by the earthquake -- the city and towns in
the province of Limon and the Valle de Estrella -- were not yet
entered into the computerized knOWledge base for the system.
61 respectfully disagree with judgments made by Benjamin E.
Aguirre in his report, "Social Aspects of the Costa Rica
Earthquake of April 22, 1991":13. Examination of other sources
and consideration of different aspects of the problem of
management lead me to different conclusions regarding the role of
the CNE in disaster preparedness and response in Costa Rica.
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The CNE relied largely on the national telephone system for
communication with outlying cities and towns, which went down
immediately in some areas and was overloaded in others. Its radio
system did not have the capacity to communicate across the
mountains to the Atlantic coastal city of Limon and the smaller
towns of Bataan, Matina, Sixaola and others in the affected area,
nor did it have the transport capability to send helicopters
immediately on reconnaissance flights to assess the damage.
Neither did the local units of the Guardia Civil, Costa Rica's
civilian response organization, have advanced communications
capability. Local and provincial committees of the CNE were not
yet developed and could not provide the two-way exchange of
information regarding assessment of damage and communication of
needs essential to mobilize national response action at the local
level. In sum, the CNE had inadequate means for direct exchange
of information between the stricken areas and its central office
in San Jose and had little capacity for organizing local action
in these outlying areas.
Ironically, the news media had both better equipment and
better means of transportation for information search and damage
assessment than the CNE, and early seized the lead in reporting
the consequences of the earthquake to the wider population. 7
However, these reports, while timely, were made from a journal-
ist's perspective and did not provide the kind of systematic,
7Interview, reporter for La Nacion, Limon, Costa Rica, April
27, 1991.
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professional assesgment of damage to the infrastructure and needs
of the earthquake-affected populations essential for effective
disaster operations.
Consequently, without adequate transportation and communica-
tion facilities to support an initial damage assessment, the
CNE's information search regarding the impact of the earthquake
in these outlying cities and towns yielded delayed, vague, and
incomplete reports that provided little basis for informed
action. The President's actions in assuming lead responsibility
for disaster response and operations reflected his ability to
bring wider resources to the task and to obtain a more timely,
accurate, and detailed assessment of needs in the provincial
regions.
The response and recovery system that evolved in the Costa
Rican disaster operations was clearly nonlinear,8 marked by
discontinuities in communication, coordination, and organization
in contrast to its predesigned, centralized, linear National
Emergency Plan. That is, the response system was "sensitive to
the initial conditions" (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) of the
disaster affected area -- the city of Limon and the towns,
villages, ports, and banana plantations in the area -- and
&rhere is a substantial literature on nonlinear, adaptive
systems that presents cogently the primary cha~acteristics of
these systems. See, for example, S. A. Kauffman. 1991. Origins
of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Eyolution. New York:
Oxford University Press; L. Comfort. 1994. ·Self Organization in
Complex Systems." Journal 21 Public Administration Research gng
Theory, Vol. 4, No.3 (July) :393-410.
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continued to evolve in unpredictable ways. However, within this
nonlinear system were sets of subsystems operating separately
with reasonable stability and purpose. There was little coordina-
tion of action or shared information among them, but they did
represent significant actions taken by separate groups in a self
organizing approach to disaster response. The next section will
identify the emergence of the major sub-systems and their contri-
butions to a quick assessment strategy that informed action in
disaster response.
Organizational Sub-systems and their Information Processes
When President Calderon assumed direct control of disaster
operations, the formal organization of the CNE became a partici-
pating member of the disaster response system, rather than the
active coordinator and manager of the system. Working under
urgent demands for action, separate groups of organizations
formed around common tasks and carried out their functions, often
crossing jurisdictional boundaries within groups, but with
relatively little interaction among the groups. Bach group
instead reported directly to the President. At least seven
distinct sub-sets of organizations were identified that performed
their own assessment of needs in the disaster-affected areas, and
organized their actions accordingly. These subsets included or-
ganizations representing the five disciplines I had expected to
study: public policy and management, medical response, engineer-
ing, public health, information processes, as well as two addi-
tional perspectives that proved especially important in this
disaster: transportation and agriculture/commerce/industry. In
9
this account, emergency response is treated as a sub-subset of
public policy and management, reflecting the urgent need for
pUblic action immediately upon impact of the earthquake. Each
set of functions will be described briefly below. Some organiza-
tions performed functions in overlapping subsets, which will be
noted in this analysis.
Emergency Response.
Fortunately, in this disaster, the loss of life was remark-
ably low, given the magnitude of the earthquake. Although differ-
ent figures were cited for the number of dead and the number of
injured, the most consistent figures reported were 47 dead and
198 persons seriously injured in Costa Rica (EQE International,
Inc., 1991; B.E. Aguirre, 1991; A. Laval, 1993; T. Sarkis, 1993).
The earthquake occurred on a Monday, April 22, 1991 at 3:57 p.m.,
with the major impact outside of the heavily populated area of
the Meseta Central. In Limon, a city of approximately 75,000
residents that suffered the heaviest impact, buildings were
largely one and two story wood-frame, concrete block, or concrete
frame structures. Only one structure in Limon, the three-story
International Hotel, completely collapsed, killing one man who
was trapped inside. Eight other deaths were reported in Limon.
More deaths occurred in the small towns of Talamanca (18) and
Matina (20), where the structures were not as well built.
Search and rescue operations in Limon and the surrounding
towns were largely carried out at the local level, by family,
friends, local police and fire departments in the first few hours
10
after the earthquake. Trained urban search and rescue teams
arrived from Switzerland and Great Britain with search dogs and
special equipment, but by the time they arrived on Friday, April
26, 1991, there was no longer need for their services. Fires did
break out, the most damaging at the RECOPE refinery near Moin,
but local emergency response organizations effectively brought
them under control.
Medical response.
The more urgent task in emergency response was setting-up
emergency medical facilities to care for the injured. Limon's
primary hospital, Dr. Tony Fascio Castro Hospital, was damaged in
the earthquake and declared unsafe for treating patients.
Emergency care was established outside the hospital, but no
surgery or treatment of serious injury could be performed.
Patients requiring advanced medical care were transported by air
to hospitals in San Jose.
Under the direction of a Red Cross physician, local medical
personnel formed a hospital station at the airport to receive
injured persons transported by helicopter from outlying towns and
villages. Patients were stabilized at this airport station, and
then transported by plane or helicopter to hospitals in San Jose
for further treatment. A pharmacy was also established at the
airport to provide ready access to medicine for injured patients
transported to the airport from outlying towns, .and, in turn, to
make medicines available to patients in outlying towns which had
been isolated by damage to the roads and bridges in the area.
11
Medical services offered by volunteer medical personnel were
organized and provided to outlying communities via air transport,
as needs were reported from reconnaissance flights.
Transportation.
Since Costa Rica has no military forces of its own that
could provide heavy equipment for logistical needs, President
Calderon requested transportation-assistance from nearby nations.
Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the United States Southern Command,
based in Panama, provided military helicopters to assist with
medical transport, reconnaissance of damaged roads and bridges,
and transportation of needed supplies, water, and medicine to
isolated towns and villages. The United Nations of Central
America (ONUCA) also provided three helicopters for the transpor-
tation of injured patients and relief supplies. In addition to
helicopters, the US provided a C-130 transport plane to carry
relief supplies and heavy equipment to areas of need.
Transportation proved a crucial element of both emergency
response and medical response, and the airport itself became an
important locus of operations management and information exchange
in this disaster. Local organizations established an operations
headquarters at the airport, with radio communications, a fax
machine, and telephones. This communications capability enabled
direct communications with national ministries and organizations
located in San Jose, as well as communications via radio to those
12
villages that could receive and send messages. Personnel at this
airport headquarters office recorded incoming supplies and
voluntary assistance from disaster relief organizations
public, private, and nonprofit -- as well as reports of needs
from outlying areas. In a spontaneous effort to match the flow
of incoming supplies to reported needs from the disaster-affected
towns and villages in the coastal region, this hastily estab-
lished operations office organized a de facto communications
exchange and record-keeping system-that provided an important
basis for informed decision. Professional guidance from the US
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, which had established
trusted relationships of long standing with the CNE, Red Cross,
PAHO, ONUCA, and the Costa Rican ministries, served an important
function in supporting the organization and operation of this
office. 9 Accordingly, disaster relief supplies were received,
stored, and dispensed to outlying communities from the airport in
an increasingly ordered manner, as disaster operations progres-
sed. As stated above, medical services to isolated towns in the
disaster-affected area were coordinated from the airport through
available air transport.
Engineering.
The engineering sub-set operated largely independently of
the emergency response, medical response, and disaster relief
organizations. The major damage from this earthquake affected
9Professional observation and interviews with operations
staff, Limon Airport, April 27, 1991.
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the transportation infrastructure of the Atlantic Region, which
severely disabled the dominant agricultural economy and commerce
of the Region by preventing the transport of agricultural prod-
ucts to the Port of Limon to be shipped to international markets.
In turn, damage to the lucrative agricultural sector created
severe damage to the economy of this small nation. This earth-
quake illustrated the destructive triggering effect of natural
disaster upon the interdependent economic and social relation-
ships of this still developing nation.
Eight bridges were destroyed or severely damaged, and
approximately 225 kilometers of roads were deeply fissured by the
earthquake. 10 These routes were essential to transport the impor-
tant banana crop across the six rivers flowing from the Cordil-
lera de Talarnanca to the coast for shipping to external markets.
Equally damaging, the Port of Limon, which handles approximately
80% of the shipping to and from Costa Rica, was disabled by an
unusual uplift of one meter in the coastal floor. This tectonic
phenomenon created the appearance of a "receding sea," in which
the water level dropped significantly, leaving previous loading
docks dry and inaccessible to incoming ships, and docked ships,
previously floating in water, beached on dry land. Damage was
also reported at the Port of Moin, on the Atlantic Coast, the
principal entry point for petroleum into the country. Given the
primary roles of banana production and export ~nd energy produc-
10 Interview, Lt. Col Richard Price, USACE, San Jose, Costa
Rica, April 28, 1991; La Nacion, April 27, 1991.
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tion in the economy of the country, reconstruction and repair of
the damaged bridges and the Ports of Limon and Moin assumed a
very high priority in the national recovery from disaster. The
sub-set of organizations that formed the engineering group tasked
to address this problem included international, national, and
local organizations, both public and private.
Anticipating heavy expenditures in infrastructure recon-
struction, President Calderon requested, and received, on April
23, 1991, a $60 million loan from the World Bank for emergency
road and bridge repair. 11 He then requested a damage assessment
of the failed bridges and an estimate of the cost of reconstruc-
tion. The US responded by sending a team of professional engi-
neers from the US Army Corps of Engineers, Southern Command,
based in Panama to conduct a technical assessment of the damage
to the bridges. The assessment team, led by Lt. Col. Richard
Price, USACE, included other professional engineers from the
USACE, the Ministry of Obras Publicas y Transporte, and a private
Costa Rican engineering firm. The group overflew all eight
bridges in a US Army Blackhawk helicopter on Saturday, April 27,
1991. 12
In this damage assessment, the engineering team checked the
11 Situation Report No.1, US Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, April24, 1991: p. 2.
12 With permission from the commanding off'icer, I had the
unusual opportunity to join this reconnaissance team in their
overflight of the damaged areas and to observe the technical team
as they carried out this assessment. San Jose, Costa Rica, April
27, 1991.
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design of the original bridges against the soils structure, the
expected traffic load, the tensile strength of the steel used in
the bridges, the size and depth of the pilings, and other con-
struction requirements needed for seismic resistance. The kinds
of information they sought were largely well-structured, tech-
nical questions which were needed to develop a set of profes-
sional recommendations for rebuilding the bridges. The group
completed their analysis of the failed bridges and their designs
for reconstruction and presented their report to President
Calderon in the following week. The president accepted their
recommendations, allocated resources from the World Bank loan,
and the program of bridge reconstruction began very quickly. In
this instance, the types of information needed for action were
well-defined, the means of obtaining it were available, the
information gathered was credible and accepted by the relevant
groups, and action followed without delay.
When asked to summarize the criteria used by the USACE in
preparing its mission and in gathering data for its report, Lt.
Col. Price listed six standard criteria used in any US military
mission:
1. Clear statement of mission
2. Specific assignment of personnel who have the skills,
knowledge, and capability to do the work
3. Detailed plan for logistics
4. Sufficient allocation of resources
5. Clear designation of administrative responsibilities
6. Designated time schedule for action
The actual content of the engineering criteria for the task is
subsumed under the second criterion: personnel who have the
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skills, knowledge, and capability to do the work. The other five
criteria all relate to means needed to carry out the task. The
effectiveness of the engineering mission and the ready acceptance
of its recommendations for action by the interested parties
indicates the value of this approach. When anyone of these six
criteria is not carefully met, Col. Price observed, the mission
is likely to falter. The criteria, in effect, assisted the
engineers in ordering and focusing the information needed for
effective action among the participating international, national,
and private organizations involved in the bridge reconstruction
process.
In contrast to the clear and rapid identification, collec-
tion, and analysis of information for bridge reconstruction,
quick assessment of damage and the development of an action
strategy took a different form in reference to housing, a second
engineering function. Approximately 850-1,000 homes were destroy-
ed, leaving an estimated 3,500 people homeless. Shelters were
established in parks and other public places, but the dominant
response was to consider housing a matter for private or non-
profit action. There appeared to be little coordination of
housing services, except for the distribution of supplies of
plastic and other materials extended through the Red Cross and
other non-governmental organizations.'3 Most persons who suffered
damaged or destroyed housing did not have insurance, and strug-
'3 Situation Report No.4, US Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance, Washington, DC, April 30, 1991: p. 4.
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gled to cope with their losses with help from family and friends.
The housing damage was more diffuse than the infrastructure
losses, affecting individual families who had no real means of
articulating their needs collectively, and no strong leadership
emerged at the local level to press for assistance in meeting
these needs. Information remained scattered, and policy makers
moved to more urgent, that is, more sharply articulated, demands.
Public Health.
The functions of public health in this disaster were closely
related to the destruction of housing and damage to the lifelines
infrastructure. Consequently, it was difficult to meet the urgent
needs for clean water, protection from infectious diseases, and
post traumatic stress counseling for the affected population
without addressing the problems of safe housing, reconstruction
of damaged water and sewer mains, and restoration of electrical
power. In examining and devising workable courses of action for
this interdependent set of problems, the local and provincial
offices of the Ministry of Public Health played a major role.
The Ministry of Public Health had the most extensive and
well-developed organizational structure of any of the national
ministries in the province of Limon and the municipalities
affected by the earthquake. Local and provincial Public Health
officials had developed strong associations with the citizen
clientele they served, and represented familiar-and respected
sources of assistance, counsel, and organizational guidance in
the local neighborhoods. Local Public Health officials worked
18
with municipal personnel to organize the delivery of clean water
to neighborhoods with broken mains, advised citizens to boil
water before drinking, identified families with old, sick, or
very young patients who needed special food, clothing, or
medical assistance, and served as a vital local reference center
for information, requests for assistance, and guidance in the
distribution of relief materials and the reconstruction of
damaged homes and towns.
In their organizational efforts, the local and provincial
Public Health officials were supported with resources and relief
personnel from the national Ministry and the Pan American Health
Organization. The long-standing development of local and provin-
cial services in public health care enabled this ministry to play
a substantive role of guidance and support at the local level.
Public Health staff, further, served an important liaison role in
working with voluntary nonprofit agencies that contributed goods,
services, and professional skills to the recovery process.
Agriculture/Commerce/Industry.
Although relatively sparsely populated, the Atlantic Region
plays a major role in the nation's economy. The major banana
plantations are located in the area and ship their produce
through the Port of Limon. The nation's only oil refinery,
RECOPE, is located near the Port of Moin. The banana plantations
are largely owned by international companies that sought assist-
ance directly from the Costa Rican Government. They also in-
creased the Government's negotiating power with international
19
monetary organizations such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. Although this group of private companies repre-
sents a small sub-set of organizations, they exercised a great
deal of influence to obtain prompt action from the Costa Rican
Government as well as substantial international monetary assis-
tance and voluntary aid for the often overlooked region. These
organizations included the United Fruit Company, Del Monte
Company, Chiquita Brand, the Chiriqui Land Company, Standard
Fruit Company, the Banana Development Corporation and others.
These organizations reported their needs directly to the Ministry
of Agriculture and Livestock and the,Minstry of Public Works and
Transport. These organizations illustrate the interdependence of
economic and engineering functions in disaster response. Engaged
in agriculture, commerce, and industry, these organizations were
directly affected economically by the damage to the infrastruc-
ture, and they, in turn, exerted an active influence to mobilize
the engineering resources needed to restore operations.
Information Processes.
As already indicated, existing communication and information
processes did not function well to serve the CNE's formal role of
coordination of disaster operations following this disaster (see
above, pp. 3-S). Although the CNE remained actively involved in
disaster response and recovery activities, the information
processes in this disaster appeared fragmented and operated
largely within functional groups that reported directly to the
President. Within each group, substantial experience and exper-
20
tise was martialed to address specific types of problems and to
devise practical courses of action. Yet, among the separate
groups there appeared to be little exchange of information or
coordination of action. This lack of overall coordination ap-
peared to constrain the effective performance of participating
organizations and to generate an unusual degree of distrust and
animosity, especially among organizations with interdependent
responsibilities. This pervasive distrust and barely concealed
hostility among different groups participating in the common task
of disaster operations inhibited frank, candid communication
among them and diminished the willingness and capacity of the
participating organizations to explore and execute the most
appropriate, feasible, and efficient alternatives for action in
response and recovery operations.
Content Analysis of Organizational Action in Disaster Response
One means of documenting the difference in actual organiza-
tional response in disaster operations in comparison to the
formal response outlined in the National Emergency Plan is
through a content analysis of the newspaper reports on this
disaster. In Costa Rica, I obtained the daily editions from two
national newspapers published in San Jose, La Nacion and La
Republica, for the period, April 23, 1991 - May 8, 1991. From the
news stories reported for this period, we identified the organi-
zations engaged in disaster response by jurisdiction, source of
21
support, and type of transaction. 14 We then counted the number
of mentions for each organization for the total period. The
results provide a rough approximation of intensity of engagement
of public, private, and nonprofit organizations in the disaster
operations process, as reported in the newspapers. 1S Table 1
presents the public organizations named in disaster response
operations by jurisdiction and frequency of mention. Table 2
presents the nonprofit organizations by the same measures, and
Table 3 presents the private organizations by these measures.
The results show a remarkable discrepancy between the formal
interjurisdictional structure of national, provincial, and local
Committees of Emergency Preparedness described in the National
Emergency Plan and actual organizational participation reported
in the news stories. Table 1 shows that organizational response
to the disaster was overwhelmingly national, with 52 national
organizations and 59.1% of the mentions. International response
was second, with 26 organizations and 31.8% of the mentions.
Further, attention appeared to focus on a small number of organi-
zations within these two categories. For example, five national
organizations received over half (51.4%) of the mentions and four
international actors received over half (50.1%) of the mentions
141 acknowledge, with thanks and appreciation, the work of
Leslie Mohr, who assisted me with this content analysis.
1sIn calculating the number of mentions, we· found that there
was considerable duplication in the stories reported by La Nacion
and La Republica. To avoid double counting an organization's
participation, we dropped the stories from La Republica in our
analysis. Consequently, the frequencies reported all derive from
news stories reported in La Nacion.
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in their respective groups. Municipal response ranked a distant
third with 28 organizations and 6.4\ of the mentions, and provin-
cial response received the least coverage with 12 organizations
named and 2.7\ of the total mentions. The local structures for
emergency response were clearly underdeveloped in this region.
Table 2 presents similar data for nonprofit organizations.
Interestingly, the largest number of nonprofit organizations are
international, at 24, receiving 41\ of the total mentions.
National nonprofit organizations were the second largest group,
at 20, receiving 48.4\ of the mentions. Five provincial nonprofit
organizations were identified, with 5.7\ of the mentions, and six
municipal nonprofit organizations were named, receiving 4.9\ of
the total mentions.
Table 3 presents the data for private organizations. Again,
the largest number reported are international organizations (18
cases; 45\ of mentions), with national organizations second (12
cases, with 21.7\ of mentions. Municipal organizations were third
(11 cases; 20\ of the mentions) and provincial organizations were
last with 4 cases and 13.3\ of the mentions. These same data are
represented visually in Figures 1 - 3, which show dramatically
the different rates of participation among the four jurisdic-
tional levels and the overwhelming number of activities by
national and international organizations reported in comparison
to activities by municipal and provincial organizations.
Two other breakdowns provided interesting perspectives on the
shape of the emergency response system as it evolved. Table 4
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shows the number of public industries and financial institutions
involved in disaster response and reconstruction, and Figure 4
shows the corresponding bar graph for these data. The data show
a dominant international response, accompanied by a strong
national response, with no organizations narned at the provincial
and municipal levels. Table 5 shows the public research and
educational institutions involved in this response, and Figure 5
presents the accompanying bar graph. The data show that the
largest number of research and educational organizations involved
in studying this disaster were national (11 cases, 79.7% of
mentions) with the second largest group international organiza-
tions (8 cases; 18.6% of mentions). Only one provincial educa-
tional organization was narned, with no municipal organizations
reported.
These findings must be interpreted in the context of continu-
ing economic and social development for Costa Rica (Lavell, 1991;
Maskrey and Lavell, 1993). Although the design for emergency
preparedness and response coordinating committees at the munici-
pal and provincial levels of jurisdiction exists formally in the
National Emergency Plan, these committees were not sufficiently
developed in practice to play an active role in emergency re-
sponse. Significant differences in organizational development,
training, equipment, and investment of resources between the
central government in San Jose and the provincial and municipal
governments resulted in an underdeveloped organizational struc-
ture in the Atlantic Region with little capacity to mitigate or
respond to disaster (Maskrey and Lavell, 1993). Local needs,
40
under these conditions, could only be met by national and inter-
national action.
Conclusions and Recommendations.
These findings document the serious lack of organizational
development and response capacity at the provincial and municipal
levels in Limon Province. While these findings illustrate a
direct relationship between initial conditions at the local level
and vulnerability to disaster, they also indicate productive
directions for emergency management.
These findings suggest the importance of facilitating interac-
tion among the organizational groups that addressed separate
functions in common response to disaster. There appears to be no
lack of professional capacity in Costa Rica, but rather a serious
lack of trust among the diverse groups with responsibilities for
disaster response and a perceived unwillingess on the part of
many participating organizations to engage in an interorganiza-
tional approach to disaster response and recovery. Steps that
facilitate information sharing and that support professional
standards of interorganizational communication and coordination
of actions are vital to increase the emergency response capacity
for the entire country. An interdisciplinary quick assessment
strategy, incorporated into emergency planning and training
programs implemented at local jurisdictional levels, would
strengthen the capacity for community action i~ continuing
economic and social development, as well as increase efficiency
in response to disaster.
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